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DECISIONS

Circuit Court of the United States, District of 3lassachusetts.
MATTIIEWS v. TIE MASSACIIUSETTS NATIONAL BANK.
Cashiers of a bank are held out to the public as having authority to act according to the general usage, practice and course of business conducted by the bank.
Their acts, within the scope of such usage, practice and course of business, will in
general bind the bank in favor of third persons possessing no other knowledge.
One of the ordinary and well-known duties of the cashier of a bank is the surrender of notes and securities upon payment, and his signature to the necessary
transfers of securities or collaterals when in the form of bills of exchange, choses
in action, stock certificates, or similar securities for loans, which are personal property, is an act within the scope of the general usage, practice and course of business in which cashiers of a bank are held out to the public as having authority to
act, and is therefore binding on the bank.
A certificate-of stock accompanied by an assignment and power of attorney executed in blank has a species of negotiability well recognised in commercial trantsactions and judicial decisions. The assignee is entitled to fill up tiemblank with
his own name, and the assignor is estopped from denying the genuineness of tile
certificate on the antecedent signatures.
Where a bank loaned money to one Coe upon a certificate of shares in the
capital stock of a railway company, which had been altered from two to two hundred by the debtor, after lie had procured it to be issued by the company, in the
name of the bank, " as collateral," and upon the payment of the debt the cashier
of the bank signed a blank assignment on the back of the certificate, with the view
of conveying the collateral to Coe, supposing it to be genuine, and Coo subsequently procured a loan of the plaintiff to the amomt of $25,000, upon tiempledge
of the same certificate so assigned in blank by the cashier, it was held tie
plaintiff was entitled to recover of the bank what damages lie had therehy
sustained.
CASE for damages.
The Massachusetts National Banik loaned
to one James A. Coe twenty-two thousand dollars payable on call
with interest, taking from him his memorandum of indebtedness
for that sum with, as collateral security therefor, what purported
to be a certificate of two hundred shares of the capital stock of the
Boston and Albany Railroad Company issued to said Massacliusetts National Bank, as collateral.
This instrument was origitially a genuine certificate for two
shares of the capital stock of the Boston and Albany Railroad
Company issued to H. E. Coe, but by false and forged erasures
and interlineations had been so altered as to purport to be a certifieate for two hundred shares of its stock issued by said railroad
e'rporation to the Massachusetts National Bank, as collateral.
VOL. XXIII.--20
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The bank received the said certificate in good faith and without
any suspicion of its fraudulent character, and in supposed fulfilment of the promise of James A. Coo to give as security for the
loan aforesaid two hundred shares of the capital stock of said railroad corporation.
Subsequently, upon payment by said Coe to the bank, he received hack his memorandum of indebtedness, and the cashier of
the bank, for the purpose and with the intention of restoring the
collateral to Coe, returned to him the fraudulent certificate, with
the usual printed form of transfer on the back thereof, signed by
II. K. Frothingham, cashier of said bank, in blank.
About two weeks after the surrender by the bank of this certificate to Coe, with the transfer in blank of the cashier on the back
of it. the plaintiff, Matthews, pursuant to his agreement to loan
Coe twenty-five thousand dollars on call with interest, received
from Coo, in good faith, the said fraudulent certificate with the
blank assignment on the back thereof, supposing the same to be a
genuine certificate for two hundred shares of said stock issued by
the corporation and duly transferred and assigned so as to enable
him to obtain a new certificate therefor in his own name, and on
receipt thereof loaned the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars.
The signature of the cashier was well known to Matthews, who
correctly supposed the signature on the blank assignment to be
genuine. Coe was tried and convicted for obtaining money by
false pretences, and indictments for forgery are now pending
against hiin, and he has been declared bankrupt. The next (lay,
or very soon after the day when the money was loaned by
Matthews, the fact first hecane known to plaintiff and defendant
of the fraudulent alteration of the certificate before it came into
possession of defendant, and plaintiff thereupon notified the bank
that he should hold it responsible for any loss sustained by him by
reason of the premises. This action was brought for the recovery
of the damages thus sustained.

Dwight Poster and G. TV. Baldwin, for plaintiff.
J. P. Converse and Edw. A. Kelly, for defendant.
SHEPLEY, Circuit J.-The real question presented in this case is
whether the bank by signing the blank transfer has so flr war-
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ranted the genuineness of the certificate that it is estopped from
setting up the forgery as a defence to this action.
Defendant denies that the cashier had authority or right to bind
the bank by the contract declared on.
Cashiers of a bank are held out to tle public as having authority
to act according to the general usage, practice and course of business conducted by the bank. Their acts, within the scope of such
usage, practice and course of business, will in general bind the
bank in favor of third persons possessing no other knowledge:
Horse et al.v. Mass. National Ban7,,-U. S. C. Court, Mass. District ;
Minor v. The Mechanics' Bank, 1 Peters 70 ; Merchants' Bankc v.
State Bank, 10 Wallace 604. One of the ordinary and wellknown duties of the cashier of a bank is the surrender of notes
and securities upon payment, and his signature to the necessary
transfers of securities or collaterals when in the form of bills of
exchange, choses in action, stock certificates, or similar securities
for loans, which are personal property, is an act within the scope
of the general usage, practice and course of business in which
cashiers of a bank are held out to the public as having authority
to act. Undoubtedly the ordinary duties of a cashier do not comprehend the making of a contract which involves the payment of
money, without an express authority from the directors, unless it
be such as relates to the usual and customary transactions of the
bank. But the transfer of certificates of stock held as collateral,
is certainly one of the usual and customary transactions of banks,
and the public would be no more likely to require evidence of a
special authority to the cashier to make such transfer than of a
special authority to draw checks on other banks, or to perform any
other of the daily duties of his office.
The signature of the cashier must therefore be considered as the
signature of the bank, and the question returns whether such blank
assignment on the back of the certificate by the bank be so far a
warranty of the genuineness of the certificate that the bank is
estopped from setting up the forgery as a defence. In the case of
forged negotiable instruments it is well settled that the endorser
warrants that the instrument itself and the antecedent signatures
thereon are genuine: Story on Promissory Notes, § 135; State
Bank v. Fearing, 16 Pick. 533 ; Hortsman v. Henstaw, 11 Howard 184; Cricklow v .Parry,2 Camp. 182; Canal Bank v. Bank
of Albany, 1 Iill 2S7. The endorser's liability in these cases is
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properly placed upon the ground of estoppel.

" This pr,,cecds,"

says Judge STORY, "upon the intelligible ground that every en-

dorser undertakes that he possesses a clear title to the note deduced f,'om and through all the antecedent endorsers, and that he
means to clothe the holder under him with all the rights which by
law attach to a regular and genuine endorsement against himself
and all the antecedent endorsers. It is in this confidence that the
holder takes the note without further explanation, and if each party
is equally innocent and one must suffer, it should be the one who
has misled the confidence of the other, and by his acts held out to
the holder that all the endorsements are genuine and may be relied on as an indemnity in case of the dishonor thereof." This is
a statement of the grounds upon which the rule of law rests as
applicable to negotiable instruments, but the reasoning would seem
to apply with equal force and pertinency to the case of a trarsfer
of a certificate of stock by endorsement in blank. Stock certificates are sold in open market like other securities and form the
basis of commercial transactions. In te language of Mr. Justice
DA~rS in Bank v. Lanier, 11 Wallace 877, "Although neithr in
form or character 'negotiable paper, they approximate to it as
nearly as practicable." In Leitch v. lfells, 48 N. Y. C13, it
is said, " Since the decision of the case McNeil v. Tenth National
Bank, certificates of stock, with blank assignments and powers of
attorney attached, must be nearly as negotiable as commercial paper." The common practice of passing the title to stock by delivery of the certificate, with the blank assignment and power. has
been repeatedly proved and sanctioned in cases which have cme
before the courts in New York. In INew York &._ew Haven
Raiboad Co. v. ,S'chuiler, 84 N. Y. 41, the rights of Iartie.z claiming under such instruments were fully recognised by the court, and
such mode of transfer was shown to be the common practice in the
city of New York. It is well settled that the form of :issigument
printed on the back of stock certificates, when sig:ned in bank,
may be filled up by a subsequent purchaser of the stock : Kortriqht v. The Commercial Bank of Buffialo, 20 Wend. 91, and 22
Wend. 348; Bridgeport Bank v. Xew York j- New Haven Railroad Co., 30 Conn. 273. The certificate in this case, as it came
from the bank, contained on the same piece of paper, amd on the
back of the certificate a blank assignment, which was all that was
necessary to transfer the title of the stock as bemween the parties.
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The defendant must, therefore, be h1 lC to have intelded and agreed
that whoever should present the certificate so issued from the bank,
with the assignment executed in blank, should be entitled -to fill up
the blanks with his own name, and to have a transfer of the stock
made to himself on the books of the company. The certificate'accompanied with the transfer, executed in blank, has a species of
negotiability of a peculiar character, but one well recognised in
commercial transactions and judicial decisions, and absolutely
essential in the usage and necessities of modern commerce to make
such certificates available in commercial transactions. Even when
such blank assignments, or powers of attorney to transfer stock,
are under seal, the blanks may be filled up according to the agreement of the parties at the time: Bridgeport Ban c v. INIew York
. Vew ifaven .Railroad Co., 30 Conn. 274-5; Pledfield on Railways, § 35, and cases cited. The decisions to the contrary in the
English courts have not been followed in this country, and they
were influenced not merely by a rigid adherence to the t clhnical
rules of the common law in relation to instruments under seal, but
by the policy of the stamp system. But the case of Walker v.
Bartlett, 18 0. B. 845, (86 E. C. L. R.), and later English decisions,
recognise the validity of blank transfers of stock, and that such
transfers of stock impose upon the holder of them the obligation to
pay calls upon the shares while they remain his property. In Kortright v. The Buffalo CommercialBank, 20 Wendell 93, speaking of
the filling up of a blank transfer of stock and power of attorney,
NELSON, C. J., after stating that this is in strict conformity with
the universal usage of dealers in the negotiation and transfer of
stocks according to the proof in the case, goes on to say, "Even
without the aid of this usage, there could be no great difficulty in
upholding the assignment. The execution in blank must have been
for the express purpose of enabling the holder, whoever he might
be, to fill it up. If intended to have been filled up in the name
of the first transferee, there would have been no necessity for its
execution in blank-Barker might have completed the instrument."
The right to fill the blank in a blank transfer of stock is recognized by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Sewall v. Tw.
Boston Water Power Co., 4 Allen 277.
Matthews clearly had the right, having advanced the sum of
twenty-five thousand dollars upon the supposed security of this
blank assignment of stock, to fill up the blank with his own name
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and with the place of his residence, and whatever was necessary
to make the instrument complete as an assignment and transfer to
him of the shares described in the certificate. The case finds that
the cashier signed the assignment in blank for the purpose and
with the intention of restoring the pledge to Coe. But even if lie
went further, and agreed with Coe that Coe should fill the blank
with his own name, such private understanding between him and
Coe would not have affected the rights of third parties who parted
-with their property in good faith without negligence upon the faith
of the certificate of the cashier that the bank undertook to assign,
and did assign, to whoever might be the lawful holder of the
instrument, the' amount of stock described therein.
As above quoted from C. J. NELSON: "If intended to have
been filled up in the minme of the first transferee, there would have
been no necessity for its execution in blank "--Frothingliam
What possible explana"might have completed the instrument."
tion can be given of the course of the cashier in giving to Coe an
assignment in blak rather than a transfer to Coe himself, other
than to enable Coe to dispose of the certificate so that the holder
could take his title directly from the bank, and that the instruinent might be used according to the well-known usage of dealing
with stock certificates, passing from one purchaser to another
without the inconveniences and delays consequent upon manifold
transfers on the records of the corporation ? If the bank intended
to limit the assignment to a particular assignee, or to a less number of shares than the number described in the certificate, the
limitation should have appeared in the assignment. The assignmnert in blank purports to assign what is described in the certificate to the lawful holder, whoever lie may be who may fill the
blank. The signature is given for the purpose of transferring
title, and whenever the blank is filled a contract of sale is established between the party who has signed the blank assignment and
the person whose name is rightfully filled in as assignee.
It is contended in behalf of the bank that the transfer in blank
created no liability or obligation oin the part of the bank to Matthews, because the circumstances under which the certificate was
received by the bank and surrendered to Coe indicate clearly that
the act of the cashier in signing and transferring the certificate to
Coe was performed with the intention of restoring the pledge to
Coe in discharge of the duty of the bank as pledgee after the pur-
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poses of the pledgd were answered, und not with any purpose of a
sale of the certificate or the stock supposed to be represented by it.
But there is nothing in the case to show any knowledge on the
part of Matthews of any such intention on the part of the cashier.
The certificate purports to be a certificate that the bank held the
shares as collateral, but does not show that they were collateral
for a debt of Coe's to the bank. Such a certificate of stock
with the transfer in blank of a responsible bank might, in the
ordinary course and usage of dealing in -stocks, pass through the
bands of many successive purchasers. The possession of the
certificate would afford no indication that the bolder of it was the
person who had originally transferred it to the bank as collateral.
If Coe bad consented to a sale by the bank of the collateral to ply
his debt, or if the bank had in any way acquired the right to sell
it and had sold it, if the assignment had been in blank the purchaser would have been in the same condition, and Matthews, in
dealing with such a purchaser, would have received no better evidence of title against the bank than le received from Coe. Had
the bank desired to sell this stock, and placed it in the hands of a
broker with a blank transfer in the usual course of business, Matthews in buying from the broker would have received no better
evidence of title against the bank than in the present case. The
mere words "as collateral" in the instrument do not tend to put
the purchaser on inquiry, except so far as relates to the authority
of the bank to dispose of the collateral as between the bank and its
debtor. If this inquiry had been made it would only have
resulted in the information that the assignment was made in its
actual form by the joint act and consent of the debtor and the
bank. The name of the pledgor was not stated in the certificate,
as is required by the Statute of Massachusetts, GenI. Statutes
of Massachusetts, ch. 68, sect. 13. In fact, if Matthews bad
gone to the bank to make inquiries, he could only have learned
that Coe having paid his debt to the bank, the certificate had been
surrendered to him by the bank with a transfer in blank. There
would have been nothing in this information to lead him to doubt
the genuineness of a certificate to which the bank had given currency by its signature, and on the fiith of which he would have
earned the bank had loaned twenty thousand dollars, which had
neen paid. The bank or the cashier did not then doubt the genuineness of the instrument, and no inquiry at the bank would have

160

MATTHEWS r. MASSACIIUS iTTS NATIONAL BANK.

inspired doubts in the mind of Matthews, there being no such
doubts in tl:e minds of the officers of the bank. Nor is it perceived how the bank can contend with any show of reason that
Matthews was negligent in not inquiring at the office of the railway corporation. If the duty of making such an inquiry was
incumbent on any one, it 'was surely incumbent on the bank to
ascertain the genuineness of the instrument before they gave currency to it, and lulled suspicion and doubt by the responsibility of
their own signature.

The answer to all the'positions taken by the

defendant as to notice to Matthews from the words "as collateral"
in tlhe instrument, is that there is nothing to connect Coe with
those words. There is nothing on the fice of the paper, and
there was nothing in the fact of the possession of the instrument
by Coc to slw that he was the person for whose debt the stock
was hehl as collateral.
Had not Matthews a right to suppose, upon receiving this certificate authenticated by the signature of the bank, that they had
obtained the certificate themselves from the railroad company in
tie usual way, thus preventing the possibility of fraud or forgery
before receiving as collateral for a loan, and before authenticating
it with their signature ? It is difficult to see in what respect Matthews was negligent.
The defendant, on tle other hand, negligently placed confidence
in Coe to obtain a transfer from the railroad company of the two
hundred shares on which they loaned the sum of twenty-two
thousand dollars, instead of taking the certificate directly from
the company. But the negligent act which especially imposes
upon them a liability in this case, is that they delivered the firged
instrument to Coe, authenticated by their signature in blank to a
transfer, thus giving to it a currency and negotiability which it
would not have possessed had they made the transfer directly to
Coe. Thus the bank put it in the power of Coe to commit the
fraud on Matthews on which this suit is founded.
In JXcziel v. Tenth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 325, the la nguage
of the opinion is precisely applicable to a case like the present.
-quch then being the nature and effect of the documents with which
the plaintiff intrusted his brokers, what position does lie occupy to.wards persons who, in reliance upon those documents, have, in good
faith, advanced money to the brokers or their assigns on a pledge of
the shares ? When he asserts his title. and claims as against them
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that he cannot be .deprived of his property without his consent,
cannot he be truly answered that by leaving the certificate in the
hands of his brokers, accompanied by an instrument bearing his
own signature, which purported to be executed for a consideration, and to convey the title away from him, and to empower the
bearer of it irrevocably to dispose of the stock, he in fact ' substituted his trust in the honesty of his brokers, for the control which
the law gave him over his own property,' and that the consequences
of a betrayal of that trust should fall upon him who reposed it,
rather than upon innocent strangers, from whom the brokers were
thereby enabled to obtain their money ?" If the bank only
intended to revest in Coe whatever it acquired from him, it would
have been perfectly easy to have limited the transfer to that extent
only. A private understanding that such was the intention
between Coe and the cashier could not affect the rights of those
who, if misled, were misled by the acts of the bank. If the bank,
by giving Coe the transfer in blank with their signature, exhibited
him to the money-dealing public as having the competent right of
pledge and disposal with all the -usual evidences of such right, it
substituted their trust in the honesty of Coe for the control which
the bank should have exercised itself over the transfer of the
instrument, and should suffer the loss consequent upon his
betrayal of the trust, rather than to suffer it to fall upon an innocent stranger.
If the conditions upon which the apparent right of control
which the bank conferred upon Coe were not expressed on the face
of the instrument, but remained in confidence between the bank
and Coe, the case is not distinguishable in principle from that of
an agent who receives secret instructions qualifying or restricting
an apparently absolute power: Jarvis v. Rogers, 15 Mass. 389;
Pickering v. Burk, 15 East 38; Patmanv. Loback, 1 Duer 354;
N
. & N. f. B. B. Co. v. SchTulyler, 34 N. Y. 41.
One of two innocent parties must suffer in this case by the fiaiid
of Coe. Under similar circumstances, courts have repeatedly held
that the party must suffer who has exhibited the greater degree of,
negligence. The leading case on the endorsement of bills of
lading, Lickbarrow v. Jl-ason, 2 Term 63, is an authority on this
point. See, also, Loidell v. Baker, 3 Met. 469; Polhill v. Waller,.
3 Barn. & Adol. 114. "
The bank is precluded from setting up the fact of the foigery of
VOL. XXIII.--21
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the instrument, because it would be a wrong on its own part anb
an injury to others whose conduct has been influenced by the acts
and omissions of the bank. SWAYNE, Justice, in Hlerchants' Bank

v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 645, says: "Estoppel inpais presupposes
all error or a fault, and implies an act in itself invalid. The rule
proceeds upon the consideration that the author of the misfortune
shall not himself escape the consequences and cast the burden
upon another." Mr. Justice CLIFFORD recognises this principle
it his dissenting opinion in that case: "If a bank may be held

liable in any case upon a certificate of their cashier that a check
is good when they have no funds of the drawer, it is not because
the cashier is authorized to make such certificate, but because the
bank is bound by his representation, notwithstanding it is false and
unauthorized." Al estoppel is a salutary rule which prevents a
man from proving that to be false which he has once represented
to be true, when others have acted on the faith of his representation.
The fact that Matthews has also a right of action against Coe,
-who is a convict and a bankrupt, does not preclude him from a
remedy against the bank: Gurney v. WVorrnsley, 4 El. & B1. 133.
Upon the facts as agreed in this case, the plaintiff is entitled t.
judgment, and according to the agreement of parties, the case is to
be referred to an auditor to assess the damages.
The foregoing opinion, although able,
learned and plausible, does not seem to
us entirely beyond question iu its conclusions. It seems difficult to maintain the argument in its application to
the facts of the case, without recognising
certificates of stock, endorsed in blank,
or with power to transfer, as negotiable
paper in the fullest sense. But this is
. proposition which the decided cases
will, in no sense, justify. Tile English
court', in the late case of Crouch v.
Credit Noncier, L. R., S Q. B. 374,
after full review of all the cases, refused
to recognise debentures issued by public
-corporate companies, in the form of negotiable instruments. made payable to
hearer, for the purpose of passing current in the market, as entitling the bond
,lJie purchaser for value to hIld them

against the equities of former holders.
In this case the debentures, which arc
the slie as our railway bonds or notes,
were under the seal of the company, and
had bcen stolen from the owner and
purchased in tle market, as above
stated ; but the court held the purchaser
could not recover. The former English
cases are here carefully reviewed, and
the concluion reached that no such security is negotiable in any such sense as
to exclude the equities of former holders
by a baod fide purchase for value : and
it is here declared that the custom of
the dealers on the stock exchange, or
of" U'rchalntq and comunercial nlt geiler.lly, to treat such securities a, ner,tiablh in the strict sense will not ha ve
the etle'ct to make them so, since lin expre-

contract on the part of the maker
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to pay the same to any bond fide assignee for value, without regard to the
equities of former holders, would be a
void contract as to the holders of such
equities, and no custom could have it
greater effect than an express contract.
In the light of this case, therefore, the
custom of dealers in the market to treat
certificates of shares, or any otber'security, as negotiable, would be inoperative to produce such result. This case,
decided within the last year, must be
decisive of the present state of the English law. And after so thorough a
review of the English cases by so
learned and able a judge as Air. Justice
it would be idle for us to
BL3C ns,
attempt to throw any further light upon
the question, so far as the English law
is concerned.
We are aware that the American
courts have come to a different conclusion in regard to railway and other corporate bonds or notes. It is abundantly
settled here that all such bonds are negotiable in the strict sense of excluding
all equities of former holders, by a bond
fide sale for value: 2 Redf. Railways,
239, p. 531 et seq., and the numerous
cases there cited, which we have referred
to in this form to save repetition. But
no such rule has ever been extended to
the sale of shares in the capital stock
of railways and other joint stock corlorations. Notwithstanding the most
Ftrenuous efforts of speculators in stocks
ti, have them recognised as negotiable,
ia order to exclude the equities of
irmer owners, and thus enable them to
tiny them safely of thieves and burglars
and other fraudulent operators in the
market, the courts have strenuously refused to endorse their schemes, and we
have good hope that they will continue
to resist all such efforts to the end ; for
we regard all advance in the direction
of making stocks negotiable, so as to enable them to be sold Wvithout showing a
clear title, as against every one, as a
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movement in favor of the protection of
dealers with dishonest holders. And it
would, no doubt, be a great protection
to honest holders of state or national
securities, as well as of municipal,
county and corporate bonds, all of which
are now negotiable, the same as bank
hills, if that negotiability could be recalled and destroyed. Burglars and
thieves do not take securities not negotiable, since they could not dispose of
them, and it would very much increase
the value of these bonds for mere investment if they were protected from the risk
of felonious taking. And the slight
depreciation in the market on account
of securities not being negotiable, is of
no account, ih comparison with the
risk of keeping safely such securities as
are negotiable under the refined improvements of the art of burglarious
and other felonious abstractions. For
the refinements in crime will keep pace
with the advancement of civilization.
The American cases of authority are
almost, if not quite, uniform in treating
certificates of stock in every form as not
negotiable. This was held in Shatw v.
Spencer, 100 Mass. 382, s. o. 8 Am.
Law Beg., N. S., 219. And the arguments drawn from the practice or custom of issuing certificates of stock in
blank, or with blank endorsements, or
blank powers, to be filled with the
names of purchasers, and to transfer
such certificates from hand to hand,
without inquiry into the title of the
holders, is here well answered by FosA
TRn, J., in delivering the opinion : "1
usage to disregard one's legal duty, to
be ignorant of a rule of law and to act
as if it did not exist, can have no standThe same rule, as
ing in the courts."
to the negotiability of stock certificates,
was held in Sewall v. Boston 1'1,ter
Power, 4 Allen 277. And in Mechanics' Bank v. N. Y. 6" . H. t/.,
13 N. Y. 599, it is distinctly declared
that certificates of stock do not partake
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of the nature of negotiable instruments,

oration, upon any paper not negoand that the boadfide assignee, with the tiable.
A blank endorsement upon
power of transfer, " takes the certifi- negotiable paper acquires at once, upon
cate subject to the equities which exi-t its very face, an artificial and convenagainst the assignor."
tiond force and import, which can
rhe proper place, and the only pro- never be recalled or explained as agaitt
lace,
ar
for the purchaser of shares in
a bond jide purclaser for value. But
a joint-stock corporation to make in- such an endorsement upon any papei
quiry in regard to the genuineness of
not negotialle acquires no such conventite certificate and the validity of the tional force, even in tite hands of a lo,I
title, is of the books of the company : jide purltaser. Upon a non-negotiablu
and any information obtained from that paper, a blank signature imports just
source may be relied upon, as it will what the parties are legally bound to
bind the company to pay tie value of
understand its import to be from the
the stock to tle purchaser of the ap- facts and circumstances inducing the
parent owner, even wlen tite shares niaking of such signature. If made to
have been transferred upon tie books enable the holder to collect dividends
of the company, by means of a forged upon the shares, or to convey the title
power from tle real owner: Dris v. to one who had procured it in the name
The Bank of Englnd, 2 Bing. 393.
of another, in order to u;e it as collatThis view would seem to end tlte argu- eral, and who had cancelled the debt, it
ment as against the plaintiff itt tte prin- would impose no obligation upon tle
cipal case, since in taking tle certificate maker. But if made upon the sale of
of Coe, he would only acquire what the debt 'with the collaterals, it would
rights Coe possessed under tile assign- import undoubtedly a guaranty of the
otett from tie defendants, which of
genuineness of the collaterals.
But
course would be none at all, since there even when made in the general form of
could be nothing more absurd than to stilt- all blank endorsements, not indicating
pose the contrary. Tie idea that one who to a third party, who became a subseis so far imposed upon as to accept a quent purchaser, bond fide and for value,
forged certificate of stock as collateral whether such endorsement in blank
security for a large advance oftmoney, were made for value, so as to bind the
and finally obtains payment of the loan endorser, or whether made without
from the borrower without detecting tile value, so as not to impose any obligaforgery, and who endorses the certili- tion: under these circumstances of uncate in blank in order to restore the certainty it is not competent for any
collateral to the borrower, thereby be- future purchaser or receiver for value to
comes responsible to the forger for its act blinly, upon the mere form of tle
genuineness, is too preposterous to gain
lank general endorsement, without incredence anywhere. But it seems to be vestigation. And if lie do so act, it
supposed that ttere was sonte mystery mutt be at his own peril. If lie is not
atout tite endorsement in liank, where- willing to trust implicitly to the hionesty
by the defendants undertook, on the and fairness of tie tolder, lie must
face-of the paper, to guarantee its gen- make inquiry at the only proper place
to obtain reliable information, the
uineness to third persons ignorant of
Iotoks of the company issuing such
the frcts. Upon general tnd well-recognied principles of law, no such con- certificate, or purporting to have done
sequence could result from any blank so. Nor is tite purchaser of such certiendorsement, if made without consid- ficate at liberty to sipple ment tile credit
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of the holder by the fact that bankers
of good credit have before made advances upon the certificate, or upon the
probability that such bankers would
not have made such advances without having satisfactory assurance of
the genuineness of the certificate. No
doubt we all act more or less upon
such grounds ; but we do it, of .course,
at our own risk and without any legal
claim upon the party to make good any
losses we may sustain by such voluntary
trust.
The only other ground, as it seems to
us, upon which the plaintiff can prefer
any just claim to recover, is that the
plaintiff has been misled by Coe,
through some agency or omission of the
defendants. The opinion seems to convey the impression throughout that there
is something in the form of this assignment, being in blank, imposing a higher
obligation upon the defendants than if
it had beau filled with the name of Coe.
We know of no authority for giving
blank signatures upon non-negotiable
instruments any greater force than if
filled up as the parties understood they
should be, -and the cases are almost innumerable declaring that no blank signature upon an instrument not negotiable can le filled up by any future
holder, except in the manner it was
agreed or understood that it should be
filled at the time it was made. This
being the law, which of course the
plaintiff was bound to know, he could
not have been legally misled by the endorsement of the cashier being in blank.
And if he was so misled, it must have
been by placing a construction upon the
facts which the law will not justify. We
do not deem it incumbent upon any one
to make formal answer to any suggestion from the New York courts, or the
national courts, that business men and
commercial men-by which we understand dealers on the stock exchangehave treated these stock certificates as
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approximating very nearly-as nearly
as pwssible-to that of commercial paper in the foirm of negotiable instrumctnts.
We need only refler to the
language of Mr. Justice FOSTER, before recited, in answer to any m.uch
rsuggestiot.
There is no intermediary or
transitive state between negotiable at,.
non-negotiable instrumentts. All contracts or instruuments or papers cre:ntiltg
indebtedness or rights of action, are
either negotiable or not so. And if
anything is fully settled in tle law, it is
that certificates of toek are not negotiable, and that lie who deals with them
is bound to know that he takes them
subject to all the rights of former
holders.
But it seems to us that the claim in
this case, that there was anything in the
defendants' connection with this certifi-cate "thatwas in its nature calculated to
mislead any one in the plaintiff's position, or which in fact really did mislead
him, in regard to the controlling facts
in the case, rests upon a false construction of the facts. Tile plaintiff knew
of course why the certificate was made
directly to the plaintiff. This must
have been done in compliance with the
statute. And there is notbing in this
indicating that the defindnts had any
agency in procuritg tie certificiate to
be issued, but thL contrary, since it
appeared ott its face to have issued as a
collateral security itt the defelndants,
which the debtor wotld naturally procure, as it issued for his benefit. And
the pretence that the plaintiff was or
might have been midled by the endorsement not being filled with the name of
Coe, or by his not knowing that it was
agreed tile blank should be filled with
the name of Coe. seems to us rather
specious than sound. The plaintiff understood of course that the bank took it
as collateral from sonie debtor, and
that they assigned it in order to convey
the title to sonic one, and this could
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only be either to the debtor pledging it,
after paying the debt, or else to some
one who purchased it of the hank, either
with the security for which it was
pledged or for the purpose of paying
the debt to the bank. Tie most natural
construction of such a transaction upon
irs fite, undoubtedly was that the enlor.ement was made to restore the title
to the debtor, since that is the more
OlUuIIOU uode of transferring collaterals
by batks, and the only one which would
come tihirly within the ordinary employtment of the cashier. The disposing of
collaterals in any other mode would

payment of the drbt to tihe cashier. Ani
who would the plaintiff nitnrdly PuppoSC the debrtor ti) he ? Why naturally
the mat who de-ired toi pledge the sanie
collateral for another lo,.
We there-

fore insist there was nothing in this
whole transaction, as under.ttowl by the
plaintiff at the time lie accepted this
certificate or collateral, caltuated to
mislead him, except his couidence in
the careful business habits of the defendants, and that is nothing for which
they are responsible to any one hut
themselves. But the case will, we hope,
be carried to the Supreme Court, where

seem to require the action of the . the decision will settle the law in such a
directors. The paper, therefore, im- manner as to put these questions at
ported on its face to be a re-assignment
of the certificate to the debtor, upon

rest.
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United States District Court, Western -Districtof 1fissouri.
In Bankruptcy.
IN nz DETERT.
Where a deed of trust of a homestead is set aside rt the ground of being a preference, the homestead rights of the fraudulent grantor are restored, and the same
result will follow where the preference is surrendered under the 23d section of the
bankrupt law.
Where a creditor who has received a conveyance which is fraudulent on the
ground of being a preference, files a consent that all the creditors may share in the
property thus conveyed, such consent operates as a surrender of his preference.

TIE bankrupt filed his petition, praying to have $1500 set apart
to him out of the assets of the estate in lieu of a homestead. It
appeared from the evidence that the bankrupt was indebted to

Comstock & Co., who sued him and recovered judgment, to delay
the collection whereof be conveyed and assigned his property, in-

cluding his homestead, to Charles F. Meyer, in trust for himself
and certain other creditors named in the deed; that within four
months after the making of this conveyance he was declared bankrupt on a creditor's petition ; that said Meyer and II. D. Hamilton were elected assignees ; that Meyer presented his own as well
as the creditor's claims named in the trust-deed for allowance as
secured; that thereupon Hamilton, his co-assignee, objected, alle-

ging that an illegal preference was attempted thereby to be secured,
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and that the trust-deed was on that account void; that said Meyer.
to avoid the objections, executed an instrument in writing, agreeing that if the objections were withdrawn and the claim-allowed to
be proven up as secured, the proceeds derived from the disposition of
the property should be equally distributed among all the creditors
of the estate; that the objections were withdrawn and the claims
allowed as secured; that a.sale was ordered by the court under the
deed of trust in conformity to its requirements, in which the assignees joined; and that the proceeds of sale were paid into the
estate and treated as part of the general fund now in court.
Johnson & Botsford, for the homestead.
ff. B. Hamilton, contra.
KREKEL, D. J.-The deed of trust made by the bankrupt to
Meyer has never been set aside, but the bankrupt contends that
the surrender of the preference by Meyer, as stated under the 23d
section of the bankrupt law, has the same effect as the setting aside
of the deed would have, and that consequently he is entitled to an
allowance to the extent at least of what the homestead sold for.
That a preference was intended to be secured by the trust-deed to
Meyer is not seriously questioned ; but the assignee contends that,
as the claim was allowed as secured, and the deed of trust held
valid, as shown by the sale under it, the proceeds must be treated,
so far as the bankrupt is concerned, as discharged from all claim
on his part.
It has often been decided, and may be said to be settled law, that
where a party makes a conveyance which is afterwards set aside on
account of an illegal preference under the bankrupt law, both the
right to a homestead and dower revive: Cox v. Wilder, 2 Dill. 0.
C. 45; T ogler v. l_ontgomery, 13 Amer. Law Reg. N. S. 244;
Aicarland v. qoodnan, 13 Amer. Law Reg. 697.
The reasons given are that the relinquishment of homestead or
dower are for the benefit of the grantee alone; and he having been
unable to avail himself of it, the same cannot go to the assignee
who claims adversely to the deed. Were it not for the deed being
in force, as it is claimed, the case, under the rulings cited, would
present no difficulty. The 23d section of the bankrupt law provides that any person having received a preference, shall not prove
the claim on account of which the preference was given, nor shall
he receive any dividend therefrom until le shall first have surrendered to the assignee all property, money or benefit. The
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manner in which this surrender shall be made the law has not determined. In the case beforc the court, Meyer was not permitte,]
to prove his claim or have any benefit therefrom until, by an instrument in writing, he had agreed that the proceeds of his preference should become a part of the general estate of the bankrupt. This may be treated in effect as a surrender under the 23d
section, and is not a mere consent on the part of Meyer for the
unsecured creditors to participate in the proceeds of his preference.
But the question remains : What effect had this surrender on the
rights of the bankrupt? If the reasons given by the authorities
cited that the conveyance was for the benefit of the grantee and could
not operate in favor of the assignee or general creditors, both of
whom claimed adversely to the doed, be sound, then it must follow
that the same effect must be given to this relinquishment of Meyer as
the setting aside of the deed had it taken place, would have had. I
am the more inclined to give this effect to the relinquishment under
consideration from the persuasive force of the Missouri case cited,
and because of the harmony thus established between the Federal
and state decisions, furnishing a permanent rule of property.
The homestead having been sold at the trustee's and assignee's
sale for $725, this amount will be set apart to the bankrupt in lieu
of his homestead.
While there is nothing in the law restraining or limiting the voluntary alienation of a homestead, it is well settled
that a conveyance thercof operates as an

c-toppel only in favor of the grantee in
the deed. The question as to how that
e.-toppel is overcome has recently been
considered in several cases. In Cox v.
Wilder, 2 Dill. C. C. 45, the grantor was
declared bankrupt ; a conveyance was
set aside at the ins-tance of his assignee
on the ground of Iraud, and the court
iell that his lomestead right was re-tored. The case of McI hrland v. Good11un, 13 Amer. Law Reg. 697, and that
of n re Poleinan, 19 lat. Re-. Rec. 94,
are of similar purport. In the case of
l"oqler
v. Jfontqomer!], 13 Amer. Law
Reg. 244, it was held tlat the sale of a
homestead without removing therefrom
did not constitute an abandonnmnt, and
that the homestead right revested upon

receiving back a deed to the property.
The above-reported case goes one step
further and establishes the applicability
of the principle to a case where the deed
is not set aside or title revested in the
grantor or his assignee, but where a
deed of trust is held valid and a sale is
Imade under it by the trustee and assignee
jointly, and the preferred creditor only
consents that all the creditors shall share
in the proceeds of the sale. Ilere the
proceeds of the sale under the fraudulent deed of trust were set aside to the
bankrupt in lieu of his homestead.
This would, at first view, seem to be going very far to restore to a party whit
he had voluntarily relinquished, hut
when the substance, and not the mere
form of the transaction is regarded, the
correctness of the judgment is apparent
H. B. JoHNsoN.
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,Supreme Judicial Court qf *'ew Hampshire.
CURRIER v. CONTINENTAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.
When a debtor dclivers money to be transmitted to his creditor, in accordance
with authority given him so to do by his creditor, and the money is lost upon the
way, it is the loss of the creditor.
The plaintiff was authorized to send money to the defendants by express, and
there were three express-carriers betfveen the residence of the plaintiff and the place
of business of the defendants in this state ; the plaintiff sent the money for the last
premium due upon his life-insurance policy by one of these expressmen, who
embezzled the money and- ran away. Held, that this was a sufficient payment of
this premium to the defendants.
Corporations are held to be subject to the same presumptions and implications
from their corporate acts, or the acts of their agents, without either vote, deed or
writing, as in the case of natural persons.'
A corporation may waive any condition inserted in its regulations or by-laws for
the benefit of the company ; and the acts of such company, or of its agents, are
competent evidence of such waiver.

THIS was a bill in equity, by John Currier, against the Continental Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn.
By policy, dated November 14th 1865, the defendants assured
the life of the plaintiff's wife, in the amount of $5000, to be paid
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was to pay an annual prcmium of
$572.70, on or before November 15th in each year, for five years.
He paid the first four premiums in person to the defendants'
agents, the first payment being made at his own house, in Salem,
N. H., when he received the policy, or before that time; the
second payment being made November 13th 1866, at the same
place; the third at Boston, November 15th 1867; the fourth
at Boston, November 15th 1868. Payment of the first was
acknowledged in the policy; for the other three paytnents he
received formal receipts. December 3d 1869, at East Salisbury,
Mass., the plaintiff delivered the amount of the fifth premium to
Laws, an expressman, to be carried to the defendants' agent; but
the expressman embezzled the money. The plaintiff prayed a decree that the defendants apply the amount in satisfaction of the
fifth premium, and credit him with payment in full of said premium, and give the plaintiff a renewal receipt, and treat said policy
as a policy paid up in full, and for general relief. It was stipulated in the policy that, if the plaintiff did not pay the five premiums when due, the 'policy should be void; and that when the
policy should become void, all payments made thereon should be
Vou. XXIII.-22
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forfeited to the defendants.' The plaintiff claimed, 1. That he was
authorized to send the money by express at the risk of the defendants; that delivery to the express was payment to the defendants;
and, 2. That the time of payment was extended a reasonable time
hevond November 15th 1869, and the forfeiture waived. 'Upon
these two points the facts were found by the court below as
follows:1. October 28th 1869, one Loomis (an agent of the defendants,
ot l'ortsnouth, N. II.) wrote to the plaintiff (then living at East
Salisbury, Mass.), enclosing a notice of the fifth premium, and saying: -- Please forward your premium on policy No. 478 to the
Port-iouth office. The two past years the Boston office has
charged us a commission for collecting; by paying here, or at the
borne office, the company saves the commission. You can forward the premium by bank check, or your own private cheek, on
ally bank or institution, and can be collected through the bank
The plaintiff sent the money
here ; or, you can send by express."
by express, relying upon this letter, and understanding that the
money was at the risk of the defendants when delivered to the express, and there was no fraud, bad faith, or want of ordinary and
reasonable care on the part of the plaintiff.
II. The first four premiums had been paid by cash and note,
half each. The notice of the fifth premium was as follows: 1' The
fifth prelniuni of $572.70, on your policy No. 478, will be due the
15th day of November 1869; interest on outstanding notes,
$68.72-8641.42; less dividend of 1868, 50 per cent. on ordinary
rate, $S7.30. Cash due, $554.12. Respectfully yours, Samuel
E. Ehnore, secretary; Geo. N. Loomis, agent. fiiBUnless the
renewal premium is paid on or before 12 o'clock noon, of the day
on which it is due, the policy is forfeited, and the company is under
no obligation to renew it; but, upon satisfactory evidence being
furnished that the insured is in perfect health, the risk may be
continned, at the entire option of the company."
The plaintiff was not satisfied with this notice, for two reasons.
Tic objected, first, that it required him to pay all cash, instead of
half cash and half note. His second and chief objection was to the
method of computing the dividend. A short time after receiving
the notice, and before November 15th 1869, the plaintiff went to
Loomis, and desired explanations on those points, but Loomis could
give none satisfactory to him; whereupon the plaintiff said he
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desired time to examine the subject and to consider what he would
do, and asked Loomis if lie should be paiticular about the time of
payment. Loomis informed the plaintiff that he had no authority
to extend the time, or to waive a forfeiture, and showed him his
instructions and the regulations of the company to that effect.
Loomis further told him that it was not the custom of the coinpany to take advantage of a forfeiture for non-payment of premium
in his class when payment was made within a reasonable time after
it was due; that be had never known the company to insist upon
the forfeiture in such a case; and that he then had charge of some
cases in which the premiums were overdue, which would probably
be paid by the insured. The precise words of this conversation
cannot now be remembered by the parties or proved by witnesses.
Loomis intended to give the plaintiff to understand that it was the
usage of the defendants, upon payment of overdue premiums, and
a certificate of continued health, to waive the forfeiture; that the
defendants were not bound to do so : that he had no authority and
did not undertake to bind them, or to bargain with the plaintiff
that they would so; but that, as a matter of fact, they undoubtedly
would do so in his case as they always did in other like cases.
The plaintiff.understood, and an ordinary man would have understood, and would have been warranted in understanding, from the
statements of Loomis, that although, by the express terms of the
printed regulations of the company, Loomis had no authority to
make a formal bargain binding, the company to an extension of
time or a waiver of a forfeiture, yet the uniform usage of the company was to receive premiums within a reasonable time after they
were due, when there was no material change in the health of-the
person insured; that the plaintiff could safely rely on this usage,
and take time to examine the subject and consider what he would
do, and defer the fifth payment for a reasonable time after November 15th, without running any risk of forfeiture if his wife should
continue in good health; that the company would receive the premium under such circumstances without objection. The plaintiff
understood, and was reasonably justified in understanding, the
statements of Loomis, not as an absolute undertaking to extend
the time, or an express promise to waive the forfeiture, but as an
assurance of a uniform usage of the company that would not be
departed from in his case; but this distinction was not drawn in
the plaintiff's mind as distinctly as it is here stated. Ile testified
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that he understood the practice of the company in regard to forfeitures for non-payment at the stipulated time, to be the opposite
of their theory.
But for his understanding, derived from the statements of
Loomis, the plaintiff would have paid the fifth premium on or beibre November 15th. Ile was induced, by his understanding of
Loomis's statements, to delay sending the money. December 3d,
the day he sent it, was within a reasonable time.
Ile wrote to one Hinckley (a relative of the plaintiff and an
agent of the defendants in Vermont, and who had received his
application for the insurance) for the explanations which lie desired, but received no satisfactory answer. November 22d 1869,
he wrote to Elmore, the secretary of the defendants at Hartford,
for explaxiation, saying, at the close of his letter: "I have deferred
the payment of my fifth premium until we come to a proper understanding of the subject. Mr. Loomis suggested that no advantage
would be taken by the company while this question was being conNovember 30th 1869, Elmore answered, giving lengthy
sidered."
explanations on the subject of dividends, and informing him that
he could pay the fifth premium in the usual way if he preferred,that is, half cash, half note,-but making no other allusion than
that to extension of time or waiver of forfeiture.
The plaintiff delivered to the express the whole amount in cash,
relying, as to extension and waiver, upon his understanding derived from the statements of Loomis and the letter of Elmore; and
if the express had delivered the money to Loomis, the plaintiff
would have received a renewal receipt, and the defendants would
have treated the policy as in force without raising any objection.
The plaintiff's wife continued, and still continues, in perfect health;
and satisfactory evidence of that fact would have been furnished
the defendants by the plaintiff, if he had understood it was desired
or necessary. He would also have paid interest on the premium,
if lie had understood that interest was demanded or expected. In
his subsequent interviews and correspondence with Loomis, io
certificate or evidence of health, or interest was demanded, but the
defendants, by refusing to give him a receipt for the fifth premium,
and insisting upon a forfeiture, on the ground that they had not
received the money delivered by the plaintiff to the express, waived
their right to such certificate, evidence and interest, if they would
otherwise have been entitled thereto.
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Before the commencement of this suit, the defendants, though
reasonably requested, neglected and refused to do what the plaintiff now seeks by this suit to compel them to do.
The court below reserved all questions of law and fact arising
.ipon the foregoing case, and involved in these two questions:1. Is the money, delivered by the plaintiff to the express, to be
considered as paid to the defendants ?
2. Is the policy forfeited by the delay from November 15th to
December 3?
On the ground on which the case was tried, if the first question
is answered in the affirmative and the second in the negative, there
should be a decree for the plaintiff; otherwise the bill should be
dismissed, unless the court should see cause for a new trial.
Hatch, for the defendants.
H. Bingham, for plaintiff.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SARGENT, 0. J.-Certain facts are found by the court upon evidence which was considered. These facts are stated, and they
raise certain questions of law, which are proposed for the consideration of the court. The policy by which the life of the wife of
the plaintiff had been insured was to be paid for in five annual
premiums, as it seems, half cash and half note. Four of these had
been paid seasonably, and receipted for; the last payment was
sent, all in cash, by express, December 3d 1869, to the defendants,
when, by the terms of the contract, it was due the 15th of November previous.
The first question raised is: 11 Was this money, delivered to the
express by the plaintiff, to be considered as paid to the defendants ?"
Loomis, the defendants' agent at Portsmouth, wrote to the plaintiff notifying him of his fifth premium, and requesting him to forward it to Portsmouth instead of paying it at Boston, as he had
done for the last two years, for the reason that the company would
in that way save a commission for collecting. He then states to
him: "You can forward the premium by bank check, or your own
private check, on any bank or institution, and can be collected
through the bank here; or, you can send by express." Any bank
check or private check'would answer, provided it could be collected
through the bank at Portsmouth. We think this was evidently
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the intention of Loomis,-that this i§ the interpretation of the
letter: "W e will receive anything in payment on which we can
raise the money at a bank here, or you can send the money by
express ;"and the case finds that the plaintiff did send tile money
by express; that he relied upon this letter, understanding that
the money was at the risk of the defendants after delivery to the
express; and that there was no fraud, bad faith, or want of ordinary and reasonable care on his part.
Loomis evidently assumed, and we may well assume, that without any notice and special request this premium would be paid in
Boston as the last two had been, and he had a special object, which
he states, for having the money paid at Portsmouth ;-hence these
directions. And if he (Loomis) was asking the plaintiff to put
himself to an inconvenience for the sake of accommodating the
company and enabling them to save a commission upon the money,
they might well be willing to take a little trouble in getting a check
cashed at the bank, or even to pay the expressage on -the moneysay seventy-five cents-rather than to pay a commission of two
per cent., which would be ten dollars, or one per cent., which
would be five dollars, or even one-half per cent., which would be
two dollars and fifty cents.
At first there was a controversy as to whether the plaintiff sent
this money by express, or paid it to the express at all; but the
court find that be did so, in- good faith, on the 3d day of December.
Was that a payment to the defendant company ? It is well settled
that the delivery of goods by a vendor to a common carrier, in
accordance with the order or directions of the vendee, operates as
a delivery to the vendee, so that the common carrier becomes the
agent of the vendee and not of the vendor; and a loss of the goods
in the carrier's hands would be the loss of the vendee and not of
the vendor. And the law went further than that, even, and lhell
that when the vendee did not appoint or name the carrier, the same
principle would hold good. Thus, in Godfrey v. Furzo, 3 P. Williams 185, decided in 1733, it was held that in case "a tradesman.
in London, by order of a tradesman in the country, sends good. to
the latter who does not appoint or raie the carrier, and afterwards
the carrier imbezils the goods, the trader in the country must stand
the loss."
So, in Dutton v. Solornonson, 3 Bos. & Pul. 582 (1803), wl:ere
it was claimed, in the argument, that if the vendee had not pointed

CURRIER v. CONTINENTAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.

175

out the particular mude of conveyance he would not be liable to
the risk while the goods were in the hands of the carrier, an,
Vayle v. Bayle, Cowp. 294, and Dawes v. Peck, 8 T. R. 330,
were cited. Lord ALVANLEY, C. J., referring to that position of
the counsel, said: " When this point was first mentioned I was
surprised, for it appeared to me to be a proposition as well settled
as any in the law, that if a tradesman order goods to be sent by a
carrier, though he does not name any particular carrier, the
moment the goods are delivered to the carrier it operates as a delivery to the purchaser, the whole property immediately vests in
him, be alone can bring an action for any injury done to the goods,
and if any accident happen.to the goods, itis at his risk. The
only exception to the purchaser's right over the goods is, that the
vendor, in ease of the former becoming insolvent, may stop them
in transitu."
So Kent states the law to be-2 Kent's Com. 499-1" Delivery
of goods to a servant or agent of the purchaser, or to a carrier or
master of a vessel, when they are to be sent by a carrier or by
water, is equivaleut to a delivery to a purchaser; and the property,
with the corresponding risk, immediately vests in the purchaser,
subject to the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu." See Chitty
on Cont. 439, 484 and 485; 2 Greenl. Ev. sect. 212; Woolsey v.
Bailey, 27 N. I. 217, 219, and cases cited; Smith v. Smith, Id.
244, 252, and eases cited. In these last two cases it seems to be
held that, though before the day of railroads it might be necessary
that the purchaser should order the goods sent by a carrier in
order to have the delivery operate as a transfer of the property to
the purchaspr, yet that, since railroads have been in operation, and
it has become the custom to transport goods by them as a matter
of course, a delivery of the goods at the depot of the railroad wou'd
complete the sale and vest the property immediately in the vendee:
Garlandv. Lane, 46 N. H. 245, 248, and cases cited; 1 Ch. P1.
6; 1 Parsons on Cont: 445; Arnold v. Prout, 51 N. H. 587.
The authorities also hold, that when the debtor delivers money
to be transmitted to his creditor, in accordance with authority given
him so to do by his creditor, the loss, if any, is the loss of the
creditor. So, if money were sent by the po~t, in a letter properly
directed to the creditor, and be lost, the debtor is discharged if
he was directed so to -transmit the money, or that was the usual
course of business between the parties: Chitty on Cont. 750. To
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the same effect is 2 Greenl. on Ev., sect. 525; and lie cites Mfarwicke v. Woakes, 1 Peake's R. 67, and lawkins v. Butt, 1 Peake's
R. 186. So, in Jakefield v. Lithgow, 3 Mass. 249, when the defendant had sunt money to the plaintiff's attorney, ina letter, by
mail, which he did not receive-held, that if the defendant was
authorized by thc letter from the plaintiff's attorney to remit that
sum, in that manner, at that time, the loss must fall on the plaintiff; if not, the plaintiff must have judgment.
So, in Kington v. Kington, 11 Mi. & W. 233, it was not doubted
that a plea that the defendant had ever been ready to pay the
money claimed, in suit, and that on a certain day the plaintiff
ordered or requested the defendant to forward the money to him
by express, and that the defendant did so, and paid the same as
directed, in satisfaction and discharge of the plaintiff's claim, was
a good plea in bar, though there was some informality in the plea
in that case. In this case, if the agent had said, in his letter:
You may send the money to me by mail, or you can send it by
mail, we should probably have understood at once that if so sent
it would be at the company's risk, and it is the same when he said,
You can send it by express. The vendee or consignee of goods or
money does not need to say: Send the goods or money by express,
or by mail, at my risk. iHe has only to designate the manner, or
instrument, or medium of transportation; and when thus sent they
are at the consignee's risk as much as though he had said in words,
"at my risk." This is implied in all such cases, and we think it
was in this case. We think the first question proposed must be
answered in the affirmative.
Was the policy forfeited by the delay from November 15th to
December 3d ? - The plaintiff was given to understand, and did
understand, that though by the printed regulaticns of the company
the agent could not, in terms, bind the company, and that the company had undertaken so to arrange it, if possible, that all their
agents should be the agents of the assured, or, at least, shall be
their own agents only to secure contracts i.1 writing by which the
company could hold all others, but that they should have no power
to bind the company to anything, yet that the uniform usage and
practice of the company was to receive premiums within a reasonable time after due, when there was no material change in the
health of the person insured ; that the plaintiff could safely rely
on this usage, and take time to examine the subject and consider
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what he would do, and defer the fifth payment for a reasonable
time after November 15th, without running any risk of forfeiture
if his wife shouhl continue in good health ; that the company would
receive the premium under such circumstances without objection.
The plaintiff understood, and was reasonably justified in understanding, that the uniform usage of the company was to waive the
forfeiture in such cases, and that this usage would not be departed
from in this case. But for this understanding lie would have paid
his premium on or before November 15th.
But he had sufficient reason to ask delay. The other premiums
he had paid, half note and half cash, and he expected to pay this
one in the same way ; and he had probably been assured that after
a few years the dividends were to be sufficient to pay and discharge
these notes-were to be fifty per cent. on the amount of his premium. But lie finds it only fifty per cent. on ordinary rate, which
lie would not be very likely to understand much of. ie acts in
good faith; he desires an explanation of these two points; he
applies to Loomis, who is unable to give him any satisfactory explanation. Ile then writes to Iinckley, in Vermont, another
agent of the company, making inquiries on these points, but receives no answer. November 22d lie wrote to Elmore, the secretary of th" company at Hartford, making the same inquiries, and
adding, I have deferred paying my fifth premium until we come to
a proper understanding of the subject. le also adds, that Loomis
had suggested that no advantage would be taken by the company
while this question was being settled. November 30th, Eluore
replied, giving explanations of the dividends, all informing him
that he could pay the fifth premium in the usual way, half cash
and half note, if lie preferred, but saying nothing further about
any extension of time or waiver of forfeiture.
The plaintiff delivered to the express the whole amount in cash,
relying, as to extension and waiver, upon his understanding derived from the statements of Loomis and the letter of Elmore;
and if the express had delivered the money to Loomis, the plaintiff would have received a renewal receipt, and the defendants
would have treated the policy as in force without raising any objection. The plaintiff's wife continued, and still continues, in perfect
health ; and satisfactory evidence of that fact would have been
furiishcd the defendants by the plaintiff, if lie had understood it
was desired or necessary. Ile would also have paid interest on
VOL. XXII.-23
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the premium, if he had understood that interest was demanded or
expected. In his subsequent interviews and correspondence with
Loomis, no certificate or evidence of health, or interest, was demanded; but the defendants, by refusing to give him a receipt for
the fifth premium, and insisting upon a forfeiture, on the ground
that they had not received the money delivered by the plaintiff to
the express, waived their right to such certificate, evidence and
interest, if they would otherwise have been entitled thereto.
The plaintiff understood, and Loomis understood, and Elmore,
the defendants' secretary, understood, that the forfeiture was
waived, and that, if the plaintiff paid his fifth premium within a
reasonable time after November 15th, it was to be received as
though paid in time; and the court find that if the money which
the plaintiff sent had been in fact received, it would have been
accepted in payment and discharge of said premium. To all intents and purposes, then, the company had absolutely agreed to
waive the payment at the day, and, if it was paid within a reasonable time thereafter, to receive it in satisfaction of the premium;
and the court find that the company has waived its right to all the
subsequent proofs to which it might otherwise have been entitled,
and that plaintiff made a proper demand, &c.
But why do we say that the case stands as if the company had absosolutely waived or agreed to waive this payment at the day appointed? It is settled, in Hale v. Ins. Co., 32 N. I. 295, that,
as a general rule, corporations have power to waive their rights,
and are bound by estoppels in pais like natural persons. Now,
suppose Loomis could not make an agreement that should bind the
company; still be knew, and could tell, -nd tell truly, what the
uniform usage of the company had been in similar cases, and the
plaintiff would have the right to presume, perhaps, that what they
had uniformly done in similar circumstances, they would do in this
case. But he finally writes to the company's secretary at Hartford, and informs him that he had deferred paying this premium
beyond time, and gives him the reasons, and states to him what
the agent had assured him about their waiving this payment.
Now, these agents and secretaries, whether they are competent to
make contracts or not, are agents of the company so far that the
company may be notified through them of any facts that concern
the company.
If a man whose life is insured dies, they notify the company
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through a:n agent, and either Loomis or Elmore would have been
a sufficient agent of the company, so that a notice to them would
ordinarily be notice to the company of such fiet. The plaintiff
gave Elmore notice of the state of facts as they existed, and this
must be considered as notice to the company; and though he may
not have had any right to bind the company by any such contract,
the company, when notified through him, should speak through
him, or in some other way, and give the notice that no such
arrangement will be *madein the specified case. But, on the contrary, when Elmore is notified of the state of the case, he gives
the desired information in regard to the dividend, and then says
to the plaintiff: You can pay this premium, half cash and half
note, if you wish, notwithstanding you have been notified to pay
all cash, and after I have received your notice that the time has
passed in which, by its terms, it should have been paid. The
company were called on to speak when they were notified that this
plaintiff fiad allowed his premium to go by the time, upon the
representations and assurances of their agent, and that he was still
trusting those assurances. They should have denied the fact as
stated, or in some way have given him to understand that he could
not rely witl safety upon those representations and assurances,AhI
t instead, the company say nothing; but their secretary says:
lo may thus trust, and no advantage shall be taken of you.
We think the company must in that way be held to have ratified
what their agent said, and to have waived all objection to that
course. They are estopped to deny that they did so.
So, in Glidden v. Unity, 33 N. II. 571, 577, it is said that in
all American courts, towns and other corporations are now to be
considered as subject to the same presumptions and implications
arising from their corporate acts, or the acts of their agents within
the scope of their authority, without either vote, deed or writing,
as in the case of natural persons. This statement of the law is
taken substantially from 2 Kent's Com. 290, and authorities there
collected in note 6. A promise may be made directly by their
agents acting within the scope of their authority, or such promise
may be implied against the corporation from the acts of its agents
within their authority, like natural persons: Smith v. Meetinghouse, 8 Pick. 178. So, in Angell & Ames on Corp., sect. 237, it
is said that a corporation may as well be bound by express promises through its authorized agents as by deed, and that promises
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may as well be implied from its acts and the acts of its agents, as
if it had been an individual ;-and see authorities in note.
So, in Pierce v. Insurance Co., 50 N. 11. 297, it was held that a
condition inserted in a policy for-the benefit of the company might
be waived by the company, and that the declarations or acts of an
agent of the company are competent evidence of such waiver by
Ihe company; and so in Lyman v. Littleton, 50 N. H. 42. Clark
v. Insurance Co., 6 Cush. 342, and Heath v. Insurance Co., 1
Cush. 257, as well as Lyman v. Littleton, 50. N. 11.42, are authorities to the point, that, when a particular objection to notice or to
proof of loss, or to anything which is required to be done, is made
and insisted on, and no others are suggested, it will be considered
as a waiver of other objections. To the same point are Vos v.
Robinson, 9 Johns. 192; Insurance Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend. 385,
401, and .ffeMasters v. W1estahester Co. Ins. Co., 25 Wend. 379.
Decree for the plaintiff.

Supreme Court of IMichigan.
GEORGE LOCKHART v. JOHN S. VAN ALSTYNE.
An agreement by a corporation to pay annual dividends to preferred stockholders without reference to its ability to pay them from earnings, is opposed tof
public policy and void.
But a contract will not be so construed as to subject it to this principle where
any other construction is reasonable.
An endorsement on certificates of preferred shares in a corporation issued by
order of the directors as follows: "1Five per cent. semi-annual dividend guaranteed from Sept. 1st 1872," signed by the treasurer, is not to he understood as a
guaranty that the corporation will pay dividends at all events, but only a guaranty
to pay dividends to the holders of the certificates in preference to others, when the
earnings of the corporation will warrant it.
A dividend, in the common understanding of the term, when applied to sonething to be paid by corporations not insolvent or. in contemplation of dissolution.
means a sum which the corporation sets apart from its profits to be divided among
its members, and so the word must be understood in such a guaranty.

ERROR to the Superior Court of Detroit.

Ward "Palmer and A. Russell, for plaintiff in error.
S. T. Douglass and George V. N. Lothrop, for defendant in
error.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOLEY, J.-The plaintiff seeks to recover of the defendant a
sum alleged to be owing to the plaintiff by the Wyandotte Agricultural Works, and for which it is claimed the defendant is liable
in consequence of the failure of the officers of that corporation, of
whom he was one, to make and file the official reports required by
law. A recovery is resisted on several grounds ; but as the question of corporate indebtedness seems first in point of order, we
shall consider it first.
The supposed liability arises upon a certificate of stock issued
by the officers of the corporation, in accordance with a vote of the
board of directors, of which the following is a copy:"Resolved, That the company issue thirty-six thousand dollars
of preferred capital stock, upon which a semi-annual dividend of
five per cent., payable on the first days of March and September
in each year, shall be guaranteed by the company; the first semiannual dividend payable on the first day of September 1872. And
the holders of any such preferred stock shall have the privilege for
one year after the first day of March 1872 of exchanging the same,
if they desire, for the common stock of the company."
The certificates of stock issued under this resolution were in all
respects in the usual form, but the following endorsement was
made upon them: "Full paid stock, 5 per cent. semi-annual dividend guaranteed from September 1st 1872. Elisha Mix, Sec'y &
Treasurer." The plaintiff became the purchaser of certificates
representing $2000 of stock, upon which the company paid two
semi-annual dividends, but has failed to pay any more, and it is
conceded that those which were paid were not and could not be
paid from profits, because there have been no profits since the certificates were issued, and the corporation has now ceased to carry
oa the business for which it was organized.
The statute which the plaintiff relies upon is sect. 1821 of the
Compiled Laws of 1857, which, on the neglect or refusal of the
directors of manufacturing companies to comply with certain provisions of law regarding the filing of their articles of association
and of annual reports, showing their financial condition, declares
that such directors "shall be jointly and severally liable in an
actiou founded on this statute, for all the debts of such corporation
co ntracted(l during the period of such neglect or refusal." This
.statute, it will be perceived, only makes the directors personally
liable for " debts." Liabilities of a company which may give
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causes of action against it and result in judgments, are not within
the statute unless they constitute present debts. A debt is that
which one person is bound to pay to another, either pi:esently or
at some fiture period-something which may be the subject of a
suit as a debt, and not something to which the party may be
entitled as damages in consequence of a failure to perform a duty
or keep an engagement. A right to a dividend from the profits
of a corporation is no debt until the dividend is declared; until
that time the dividend is only something that may possibly come
into existence; but the obligation on the part of the corporation to
declare it cannot be treated as the dividend itself: In re London
India Rubber Co., Law Rep., 5 Eq. Cas. 525. This seems to be
conceded by counsel for the.plaintiff, who insist that the guaranty
in this case is not of dividends to be made necessarily of profits,
but of dividends to be made of some sum which the corporation
undertakes to set apart for ,the purpose, and which, if there are
no profits for the purpose, there is an absolute and unqualified
obligation to pay from some other source. In other words, that
the word "dividend" means only something to be divided; and to
the persons who are to participate in the division it is immaterial
whcnce it comes, so that the fund be actually provided and payment made in pursuance of the obligation.
We are referred to no authority in which the word dividend has
been interpreted in accordance with this view, nor are we aware
that it is used in this sense among business men. A dividend to
the stockholders of a corporation, when spoken of in reference to
an existing organization engaged in the transaction of business, and
not of one being closed up and dissolved, is always, so far as we
are aware, understood as a fund which the corporation sets apart
from its profits to be divided among its members. A corporation
of which it is said that it is making an annual dividend of ten per
cent. upon its stock, is supposed to be a prosperous corporation
because its gains leave it this clear annual percentage which it can
pay over without impairing its capital. A dividend among preference stockholders exclusively is understood to imply that the sum
divided has been realized as profits, though the earnings do not
yield a dividend to the stockholders in general. We hazard nothing in saying that this is the primary and universal understanding of a dividend on stock, except when made use of in respect to
a final closing up and distribution of assets on the occurrence of
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insolvency or in view of a dissolution. This is manifestly the view
of the court in Stevan8 v. South Devon Railway Co., 9 Hare 312;
Harvey v. Great Northern Railway Co., 1 De Gex and Jones 605;
Sqft v. Hartford,P'. & T. Railroad Co., 8 R. I. 310; and in every
other case in which we have found the word employed in any connection corresponding to that in which it is made use of here.
The difficulty in this case springs from the fact that in the case
of this corporation there are no profits from which a dividend can
be 'Made. The question arises in view of that fact, whether the
guaranty becomes wholly inoperative for want of something to
which it is applicable, or whether on the other hand it can be
understood as binding the corporation to make payment of the divi(lend in any contingency, and to respond in damages to an equivalent amount in case of failure.
The latter is the theory of the present suit; the plaintiff reading
the guaranty as a promise in perpetuity to pay a semi-annual dividenl of five per cent. to the preference stockholders, profits or no
profits; in other words, to pay it from profits, if any there are, but
if not, then from whatever assets or means the corporation may
possess, so long as anything shall remain to pay with.
If this be the correct view to take of the guaranty, it involves
some results which will certainly be extraordinary. Whatever
shall be the construction of this instrument, it will still remain true
that a dividend, as generally understood, and as the public will
understand it, is a sum which can be divided among stockholders
without touching the capital stock. The declaration of a dividend
is a most emphatic assertion that the corporation is in condition to
make a division of profits, and is consequently enjoying some
degree of prosperity. So generally is this understood that the
making of a dividend when the capital must be encroached upon
for the purpose is looked upon as highly discreditable, if not ababsolutely dishonest and fraudulent, as involving an assertion of
prosperity, which under such circumstances would be deceptive and
tending to give the corporation a credit to which it is not entitled.
The corporation which should make such a dividend, would, when
the facts became known, be condemned by the public sentiment,
and the officers who should participate would be looked upon as
wanting in that business integrity which is essential to entitle them
to public confidence. So forcibly has this been felt, that the legislature in providing for the formation of corporations has in some
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cases imposed penalties upon the corporate officers who participate
in making dividends when the corporation is not in condition to
warrant it; and this legislation is only an expression of- the public
sentiment which condemns such action as unwise and misleading,
and every way impolitic. And the impolicy is only emphasized
and made the more distinct and manifest by the circumstances
which surround this case.
For here the preference stock upQn which the dividends were to
be paid was issued for the purpose of strengthening the corporation and giving it the necessary means to put itself on a footing
of success. Indeed the issue of such stock can very seldom be
justified except to strengthen the corporate standing, or to enlarge
the corporate means and business. The issue is usually made
when the corporation has reached a crisis in its affairs, and the
corporators are unable or unwilling to put more means at risk in
the business, but are nevertheless disposed to give to those who
will do so a first participation in any profits which the increased
means will enable them to make. The contracts made under such
circumstances usually in express terms confine the advantages of
the new stockholders to this preference; and thus confined there
can be no reasonable objection to them if they are entered into with
full knowledge on the part of all concerned. But the guaranty is
is in this case understood to go farther, and not only give a preference in the division of profits, but to entitle the holder to such an
apportionment of the assets of the corporation from year to year
when there are no profits, as may eventually consume the whole,
leaving the other stockholders nothing. It is not a mere preference that is given to the holders under this construction ; it is a
preference with a perpetual promise to pay the largest interest
permitted by law on the sum invested by them, profits or no profits,
so that the holders have at the same time all the advantages of
stockholders and of creditors, while their associates are postponed
as stockholders, and considered as representing the debtor corporation they are deprived by the very contract itself of any reasoriable probability of restoring the standing and strength of the corporation when once it shall have ceased to be steadily, and continuously prosperous. For an agreement to pay semi-annual dividends
from earnings when there are any, and from capital when there znot, is only a new foim of the understanding by which the d,,cor
is to pay from his profits if the ship comes in, and from the pound
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of flesh if it does not; every dividend from the capital being an
attack upon the very life of the corporation, before which under
ordinary circumstances it must inevitably and speedily give way.
And thus the contract, the only justification for which is the
strengthening of the corporation, is found to contain within itself
a provision which, except in the event of steady prosperity, must
inevitably tend to its weakening and almost certainly to its
destruction.
It may be well also to consider what would be the
position of
the two classes of stockholders-the common and the preferredwith reference to the corporate management and business. Both
without doubt have an equal right to participate in management,
and officers may be chosen indifferently from either. Eithcr class
may be the larger, and by combination of its members may secure
control. Now the earning of a dividend in any business depends
more or less on many external circumstances, on the general state
of trade in the country, competition in the particular business, the
condition of crops, accidents of fire and flood, ncw inventions affecting the use or profitableness of machinery employed or fabrics produced, the dishonesty or carelessness of subordinates, and a thous:ind other circumstances which may seriously affect earnings, but
against which care and foresight can but knperfectly provide. But
perhaps more than on all these circumstances a dividend will depend
on the good judgment, fidelity and integrity of the managing parties; and the officers of a corporation who agree on its behalf to
earn and pay one, can only be understood as undertaking for whatever good judgment, integrity and fidelity can accomplish. In this
view the contract in question can only be regarded on the plaintiff's own construction, as a contract of guaranty that the integrity
and good management of the officers shall produce the dividends.
But suppose those officers to be-as they well may be-the preference stockholders themselves, then we have the corporation guarantecing to them their own integrity and good management, and
promising to make up to them from its capital whatever in expected
results that management may prove deficient in.
But these are not the only anomalous results that may flow from
such a construction. To the success of a corporation it is important if not essential that there should be substantial harmony of
interest among the corporators. Such harmony may exist among
common and preference stockholders, if the preference extends
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only to a division of profits, but when it goes farther it disappears
A preferred stoekholdei
and antagonism necessarily comes in.
who is entitled to his dividend in perpetuity is interested in keeping a failing concern in existence until his dividends can wholly
exhaust its means. A common stockholder is interested in bringing about a dissolution, because when that takes place, the dividends will cease, the assets Imust be divided and he may have a share.
The whole capital and assets of the concern may consequently be at
issue between these classes in the corporate elections; the one class
anxious to put an end to the corporation, because only in that
event can they have anything to withdraw, while the other are concerned if possible to have its means locked up where they are;
though they may have wholly ceased to accomplish the ends of the
corporate existence, because in that way they may at length absorb
the whole. It may safely be asserted that legislation would never
purposely have placed corporators in such anomalous relations.
And it is certain that public policy is opposed to any tying up of
capital where it has ceased to be productive, in order that debts
may accrue to absorb it. Moreover the very statement of the
effect of dissolution of the corporation upon this guaranty shows
how inaccurate it must be to speak of the obligation created by it
as constituting a " debt " ; a debt is the same whether the debtor
lives or dies, though in the latter contingency nothing may be realized; but here in the event of corporate dissolution, nothing is
received by the supposed creditor, and nothing is due him.
A contract the necessary construction of which would be th.t
on which the plaintiff relies, and which would lead or tend to the
consequences pointed out, which would require dividends when
honesty and good faith to the public would forbid and public
opinion condemn them; which would antagonize the positions of
different classes of men engaged in the same joint undertaking,
and preclude harmony of action and union of effort precisely under
those circumstances when harmony and union would be most
essential; under which the corporation making it must almost
inevitably be destroyed, unless it should enjoy continuous prosperity, and which, under some circumstances, would make one
class of persons having a voice in the control and management of
the corporation interested in so controlling its means as to keep
them as long as possible in an unproductive condition, until by a
slow process they can absorb them to the prejudice of tle*r asso-
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ciates, must necessarily be opposed to public policy and void. And
a contract which will bear any other reasonable construction
could not, consi-:tently with tile rules of law, and with regard to
what must be deeled the intent of the parties, that their contracts
should ba, just, reasonable and beneficial, have this construction
put upon it.
We think the guaranty here in question will bear the construeti,,! that the preference stockholders shall be entitled to five per
cent. semi-annual dividends, when there are profits to pay thelm,
and not otherwise. Probably if profits were not realized to the
necessary amount in any one year, they would be entitled, when
they were realized, to have all arrears made up : Henry v. Great
hrorthern Radlway CYo., 1 Do G. & J. 635: Taft v. .Hartford,
J.e., Railroad Co., 8 R. . 334. This we think is what would be
the gencral understanding of such a guaranty, and this is as far as
the law would limit a corporation to go in guaranteeing dividends
to its own members; and to this extent no rule of good faith or
of p ublic" ul,.l'y is in the way. An individual holding and selling
stock might give a broader guaranty, but that has nothing to do
with time questions arising upon this instrument.
There are two branches to the plaintiff's argument; the other
being that if the guaranty is void as opposed to public policy, or
if there was any defect of authority in the directors of the company issuing the preference stock without a previous assent of
stockholders, then the money paid by the plaintiff to the company
f)r the stock, is money which the company received to his use, and
which therefore lie may recover in this action. Upon this it is
sufficie-nt to remark that the guaranty, properly construed, is not
void, but unobjectionable, and that if there was any defect in
power in the directors to issue the stock, the corporation is not
shown to have raised any question on the subject, and the recognition of the stock at the meetings of the corporation is fully
shown.
The ruling of the court below appears to us correct, and the
judgment will be affirmed with costs.

The other justices concurred.

SPRATLEY v. MUTUAL INS. CO.

Vourt of Appeals of.Kentucky:
ANN SPRATLEY v. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE CO.
A policy of insurance issued by a New Jersey company to a citizen of Virginia,
containing no condition for the payment of premiums in any other place than
.New Jersey, is a contract to be performed in the latter state, and must be governed
by its laws.
A policy was issued by a New.Jersey company to a citizen of Virginia in 1860.
Payment of subsequent premiums was prevented by the war. The insured life
terminated in 1863, and notice and proofs of that fact were made to an agent of
the company in Kentucky in 1872. Aeld, (1) that the parties were bound to give
notice in a reasonable time; (2) that the delay here was unreasonable ; (3) that
the Acts of Virginia suspending the statutes of limitation in certain cases did not
apply to foreign debtors like this company; (4) that the Statute of Limitations
must be held to have commenced to run within a reasonable time (six months)
after the termination of the war, and the policy not being under seal was barred
in six years by the laws of New Jersey and in five by the laws of Virginia, and
therefore could not be recovered upon in Kentucky.

APPEAL from Jefferson Court of Common Pleas. Action on a
policy of insurance on the life of plaintiff's husband.
October 9th 1860, the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company

issued to Ann E. Spratley, of Suffolk, Virginia, a life policy for
$5000 upon the life of her husband, Thomas W. Spratley. Before
the annual premium for 1861 fell due, the powers of the agent at
Suffolk had been revoked in consequence of the civil war. For
that reason said annual premium and those subsequently falling
due were not paid.
In September 1863, Thos. W. Spratley died at Petersburg, Virginia. In October 1872, Mrs. Spratley, through her agents and
attorneys, delivered to K. W. Smith, agent for the insurance company at Louisville, Kentucky, proof of the death of the insured.
On the 17th of February 1873 this action was instituted.

Bullitt ".Parris,for plaintiff.
Grazlay . Reinecke, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LINDSAY, J.-The company relies on numerous defences, among
others, the failure by the assured within reasonable time to present
due notice and proof of death. It also pleads and relies on the
statutes of limitation. It is in proof that the limitation to actions
on life insurance policies not under seal (as is the case with this
one), is six years in New Jersey, the domicile of the company. ar
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five years in the state of Virginia, where appellant insists that all
tlhe stipulations of the contract were to be performed. Counsel
argue that as by the terms of the policy the money is i.ot due and
payable until ninety days after due notice and proof of death, limitation does not begin to run until such notice with proof is given to
the company. They attempt to assimilate the contract sued on
to notes payable on demand.

It seems to us that there is an

essential difference between then,. In cases of notes payable on
demand, the debtor is fully advised as to the existence of his debt,
and of his subsisting obligation to pay it. It is within his power
to seek his creditor, and discharge himself from liability by paying
it. So long as lie remains quiet and inactive, it is to be presumed
that lie consents to the inactivity of the creditor, and that the time
when the limitation is to begin to run is postponed by the consent
of both the parties to the contract. Not so in cates of life insurance. Tho company has no certain means of ascertaining when by
the death of the insured its liability to pay accrues. To remedy
this difficulty, the contract requires the assured to notify the insurer
of the happening of this event.
The presumption is conclusive that the parties to the contract
intended that this notice should be given as soon as it is reasonably
possible to'do so. The insurer has the right whilst the witnesses
are still alive, and the circumstances still fresh in their memories,
to investigate the causes of the death, in order to ascertain whether
or not it is liable to pay the insurance. In cases of appaently unreasonable delay, the assured must present a satisfictory explanation therefor, or else the statute should be held to begin to run
within a reasonable time after the death.
In this case the prevalence of civil war rendered it impossible
to make and present the proof until about the middle of the summer
of 1865.
The evidence shows, however, that with reasonable diligence the
assured might have been in an attitude to sue by the 1st day of
January 1866. The action was therefore barred in Virginia under
the statutes of limitation of that state on the 1st day of January
1871. It is claimed, however, that the running of the statute in
said state was suspended by legislative enactment.
On the 2d day of March 1866, the Virginia legislature passed a
statute providing that the time intervening between the 17th of
April 1861, and the enactmenit of said statute should be excluded

SPRATLEY v. MUTUAL INS. CO.

from the computation of time within which it was theretofy .e uccu
sary to commence any action or proceeding.
By this act the limitation commenced to run on the 2d of Mardi
1866, and the action was barred on the 2d of March 1871.
But it is claimed that the statute was still further suspended by
an act passed on the same day, which deprived creditors of the
right to enforce the collection of certain of their debts until the 1st
day of January 1868, and provided that the time during which
said act should remain in force should be excluded from the computation of time within which any action or proceeding was required to be commenced.
Foreign debtors were excluded from the operation of this act.
The first section of this act was afterwards continued in force until
the 1st day of January 1869. We need not determine whether
this amendatory act also continued in force the section of the act
of March 2d 1866, suspending during its operation the statutes of
limitation.
Appellee was a foreign debtor at the time both the original
and amendatory statutes were passed, and therefore was not affected
by them.
It may be that the laws of Virginia gave to foreign insurance
companies doing business in that state before the war "a sort of
local existence," as was held by a bare majority of the Virginia
Court of Appeals in the case of the ianhattan Life Insurance
Co. v. Warwick, 20 Grattan 614.
But, if this be true, it is equally true that the course pursued
by Virginia in the war between the states effectually uprooted and
destroyed "the sort of local existence" this appellee had in that
state. Its domicile was within a state adhering to the federal
government, and from the time hostilities commenced between
Virginia and the federal governrpent this appellee could not
comply with the laws of Virginia, and therefore, without fault
upon its part, it lost its quasi local habitation in that state, and, as
a matter of necessity, assumed towards Virginia and her laws its
original character of a foreign corporation.
It was therefore, so far as this record shows, a foreign debtor in
March 1866, and in nowise affected by the provisions of the act of
the .2d of that month.
But in addition to all this, the policy of ifisurance was a New
Jersey contract, to be performed, so far as the payment of insurance

